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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Smith asserts that the State has failed to demonstrate any error in the district 
court's order granting his motion to suppress the State's evidence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Terry Smith was charged with trafficking in marijuana based upon the State's 
allegation that Mr. Smith had possessed more than five pounds of marijuana. (R., 
p.26.) The State's charge was the result of a traffic stop that allegedly uncovered 
approximately eight pounds of marijuana. (R., pp.3-6.) Thereafter, Mr. Smith filed a 
motion to dismiss. 1 (R., p.4D.) In his memorandum in support of this motion, Mr. Smith 
raised two challenges to his detention and the search of his vehicle. First, Mr. Smith 
asserted that the officer who performed the traffic stop unlawfully extended his detention 
for the offense of speeding in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (R., pp.44-49.) 
Second, Mr. Smith asserted that the officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to 
require him to exit his car and to use a drug dog to sniff the exterior of his vehicle once 
the purpose of the traffic stop had been completed. (R., pp.44-49.) Mr. Smith provided 
the district court with police reports and a transcript of the preliminary hearing in support 
of his motion to suppress. (R., pp.51-112.) 
The police incident report and preliminary hearing transcript reflect that Mr. Smith 
had been stopped by Officer Tyler Scheierman for speeding. (R., pp.53, 73-74.) 
1 This motion was properly characterized by the district court as subsuming a motion to 
suppress the State's evidence in light of the nature of Mr. Smith's claims and the relief 
requested. (R., p.148.) 
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Mr. Smith acknowledged the violation and provided Officer Scheierman his license and 
registration upon the officer's request. (R., pp.53, 76.) However, rather than 
immediately run a check on his license, the officer decided to ask Mr. Smith questions 
unrelated to the traffic offense. (R., p.53.) While Mr. Smith was still being detained, and 
prior to running any checks on his license and registration, Officer Scheierman 
questioned Mr. Smith regarding "his travels," including both where he was going to and 
where he was coming from. The officer testified at the preliminary hearing that he 
questions people regarding where they are coming from and going to in every single 
traffic stop he performs. (R., pp.71-72.) Because Mr. Smith paused for "two seconds" 
during questioning, had maps, garbage, and a food cooler in his car, and didn't have a 
lot of luggage, Officer Scheierman was suspicious. (R., pp.53, 76-81.) According to the 
officer's own estimate, he remained at Mr. Smith's car and questioned him for 
approximately five to seven minutes. (R., pp.80-81.) 
The officer eventually stopped questioning Mr. Smith and returned to the task of 
checking his license and registration. This check revealed that Mr. Smith had a valid 
license and no outstanding warrants. (R., pp.53, 82.) But instead of writing out a 
citation for Mr. Smith's speeding violation, Officer Scheierman then decided to run 
additional checks on Mr. Smith and also requested assistance from another officer. (R., 
pp.53, 82.) According to the officer's testimony, he has performed a nationwide search 
for outstanding warrants on every individual that he has ever stopped for a traffic 
violation. (R., p.83.) Again, without writing out a citation for speeding, Officer 
Scheierman also returned to Mr. Smith's car, ordered him out of the vehicle, and 
continued to question him about matters unrelated to the speeding violation. (R., p.53.) 
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The officer admitted that it was not normal for him to order a driver out of his or her 
vehicle during a routine traffic stop. (R., p.94.) Mr. Smith was also patted down for 
weapons while outside the car. (R., p.S3.) 
During the process of the second questioning of Mr. Smith, the second officer 
arrived. (R., pp.S3-S4.) Officer Scheierman believed that Mr. Smith's eyes were "glassy 
and glazed over" at the time of this questioning. (R., pp.S4, 8S.) Because Officer 
Scheierman knew that Colorado had medicinal marijuana laws, the officer also asked 
Mr. Smith if he was traveling with a medical marijuana card. (R., p.8S.) Mr. Smith 
admitted to having a medical marijuana card and provided it to Officer Scheierman. (R., 
pp.S4, 8S-86.) He refused, however, to allow the officer to search his car. (R., pp.S4, 
86-87.) 
It was only after removing Mr. Smith from the car, patting down his person upon 
removing him, and questioning him a second time about matters unrelated to his 
speeding violation that Officer Scheierman further extended the traffic stop by using a 
drug detection dog to sniff the exterior of Mr. Smith's car. (R., p.S4.) The nationwide 
check had actually returned by the time the officer was getting his drug detection dog in 
order to run the sniff test on Mr. Smith's vehicle. (R., p.87.) The results of the 
nationwide check revealed that Mr. Smith did not have a driver's license in any other 
state and had no warrants in any other state. (R., p.96.) Upon being deployed by 
Officer Scheierman, the drug dog allegedly alerted to the vehicle. (R., p.S4.) 
Officer Scheierman then searched the inside of Mr. Smith's car. (R., pp.S4, 89.) 
He opened a suit case inside the car. (R., pp.S4, 89.) Inside were two large, black 
garbage bags. (R., pp.S4, 89.) Inside of those bags were additional, smaller bags 
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containing what the officer believed to be marijuana. (R., pp.54, 89.) At this point, 
Officer Scheierman instructed the second officer to handcuff Mr. Smith, who was then 
placed in the back of the officer's vehicle. (R., p.54.) A subsequent search of 
Mr. Smith's car revealed $1,350 in cash in another bag and a box of garbage bags. (R., 
p.54.) The total weight of the substance alleged to be marijuana that was found in the 
car was approximately eight pounds. (R., p.55.) 
In response, the State asserted that the use of the drug detection dog by Officer 
Scheierman did not prolong the detention of Mr. Smith. (R., pp.123-130.) In the 
alternative, the State argued that any extension of the traffic stop by the use of the drug 
detection dog was constitutionally permissible because it was supported by reasonable, 
articulable suspicion. (R., pp.123-130.) The State also argued that it was 
constitutionally permissible for a law enforcement officer to request that an individual 
exit the vehicle during a traffic stop. (R., pp.129-130.) But the State never addressed 
Mr. Smith's claims that the officer's prolonged questioning on matters entirely unrelated 
to the traffic stop unlawfully extended the duration of his detention. (R., ppA5-49, 123-
130.) Mr. Smith reiterated his arguments regarding the unlawful extension of his 
detention during the traffic stop in his reply memorandum, including that the unlawful 
extension of the traffic stop included the protacted questioning by Officer Scheierman 
on matters unrelated to the alleged traffic offense. (R., pp.137-142.) 
At the hearing on Mr. Smith's motion to suppress the State's evidence and 
dismiss the charge against him, the State presented only the testimony of Officer 
Scheierman. (Tr., p.3, L.23 - pA, L.3.) The officer testified consistently with his prior 
testimony at the preliminary hearing. (Tr., p.8, L.10 - pA4, L.21) Officer Scheierman 
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added that the check specifically for whether Mr. Smith's license was valid and for 
warrant's in his home state of Colorado took one about one minute to complete. (Tr., 
p.14, Ls.13-20.) In contrast, the nationwide background check that the officer also 
chose to run took approximately five minutes to complete. (Tr., p.15, Ls.14-24.) Officer 
Scheierman further testified that he never bothered to write up any ticket for Mr. Smith's 
traffic offense at any point during the traffic stop. (Tr., p.26, L.23 - p.27, L.12.) 
Following the testimony of Officer Scheierman and the arguments of the parties, 
the district court took Mr. Smith's motion to suppress and to dismiss the case under 
advisement. (Tr., p.64, Ls.9-25.) The district court ultimately granted Mr. Smith's 
motion to dismiss. (R., pp.148-163.) The State timely appealed from the district court's 
order granting Mr. Smith's motion to dismiss. (R., p.174.) 
5 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it granted Mr. Smith's motion to suppress the State's 
evidence? 
6 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Correctly Granted Mr. Smith's Motion To Suppress The State's 
Evidence 
A. Standard of Review 
This Court applies a bifurcated standard of review upon a challenge to a trial 
court's ruling on a motion to suppress. First, this Court defers to the district court's 
findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous. See, e.g., State v. 
Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482,485 (2009). This Court also gives deference to any implicit 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial and competent evidence. State v. 
Frank, 133 Idaho 364, 367 (Ct. App. 1999). Second, this Court reviews de novo the trial 
court's application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. Willoughby, 147 
Idaho at 485-486. 
B. The District Court Correctly Granted Mr. Smith's Motion To Suppress The State's 
Evidence 
The State has not challenged any of the district court's factual findings in this 
appeal. As such, the question for this Court is whether, in light of the facts as found by 
the district court, the district court erred in granting Mr. Smith's motion to suppress the 
State's evidence. Mr. Smith submits that the district court's ruling granting his motion to 
suppress was amply supported both by the evidence and by governing case law, and 
that this Court should therefore affirm the district court. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution secures to the people 
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Willoughby, 147 
Idaho 482, 486 (2009). The protections of the Fourth Amendment have been 
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incorporated to apply to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810(2009). 
"When a defendant moves to exclude evidence on the grounds that it was 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the government carries the burden of 
proving that the search or seizure in question was reasonable." Id. at 811. In addition, 
even brief detentions of individuals must meet with the Fourth Amendment's 
requirement of reasonableness. Id. This means that the detention must be both 
justified at its inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that 
originally justified the interference in the first place. Id. 
Limited detentions of individuals may be permissible where there is reasonable, 
articulable suspicion on the part of the officer that the person detained has committed, 
or is about to commit, a crime. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811. However, the officer must be 
able to point to specific, articulable facts in support of the detention - and this requires 
more than a mere hunch on the part of the officer or "inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion." Id. (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)). Whether an 
officer possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion is evaluated by examining the 
totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of, or before, the detention. 
Id. Moreover, the "scope of the detention must be narrowly tailored to its underlying 
justification," and the investigative detention cannot last any longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). 
These same standards apply where the detention at issue is a traffic stop. See, 
e.g., State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct.App. 2005). "The question whether an 
investigative detention is reasonable requires a dual inquiry into (1) whether the officer's 
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action was justified at its inception, and (2) whether it is reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." !d. While the 
purpose of a stop is not inevitably fixed at the point of the initiation of the traffic stop, 
and may evolve based upon additional information coming to light, any extension of the 
detention must be carefully tailored to the underlying justification of the stop. Id. at 562-
563. 
In this case, the State has challenged the district court's determination that the 
stop of Mr. Smith for speeding was unlawfully extended, and therefore the evidence 
obtained as a result of this detention must be suppressed. The State's argument 
erroneously looks to one sentence in the district court's order where the court notes an 
admission made by Officer Scheierman in which the officer admits to departing from his 
normal routine for a traffic stop. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.) In doing so, the State 
attempts to cast this single statement - taken in complete isolation from the context of 
the court's entire order - as the basis for the court's holding. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.) 
However, a review of the totality of the court's order reveals this interpretation to be 
unsupported by the record. 
The district court did acknowledge, at one point in its order, a statement made by 
Officer Scheierman that included the officer's belief that he had reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity after he initially contacted and questioned Mr. Smith. (R., p.158.) 
However, the trial court's legal analysis had nothing to do with the officer's personal 
belief, but rather looked to the second portion of the officer's statement - that he was 
going to "inquire further" of Mr. Smith on matters unrelated to his traffic offense -
coupled with a thorough examination of the officer's own actions as objective evidence 
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that the traffic stop had been unlawfully extended. (R., pp.156-163.) This much is clear 
from the district court's statement that, "the focus is on the conduct itself and whether it 
can be supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity." (R., 
p,162.) 
Moreover, to the extent that the district court did consider any portion of the 
officer's statement of personal belief, the context surrounding this remark shows that the 
district court was merely making an adverse credibility determination regarding Officer 
Scheierman's claim that he was treating the stop of Mr. Smith as a routine traffic stop. 
(R., pp.157-158.) In the passage immediately preceding the remarks challenged by the 
State as the court's "holding," the district court canvassed the officer's testimony that 
tended to imply that the actions taken by Officer Scheierman were part of the routine 
that he follows for every traffic stop. (R., pp.157-158.) In noting that the officer himself 
was more concerned about criminal activity being afoot, and focusing on the officer's 
decision to investigate this hunch that was unrelated to Mr. Smith's speeding offense, 
the court was rejecting Officer Scheierman's testimony that all of his actions were 
merely part of the routine he followed for every traffic stop. Decisions regarding the 
credibility of the evidence, as well as inferences from the evidence, are solely within the 
province of the trial court. See, e.g., Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810. Because the district 
court was empowered to make just such a credibility determination, there was nothing 
improper in the court noting the inconsistencies in Officer Scheierman's testimony. 
Turning to the court's actual holding in this case, the court correctly held that 
Officer Scheierman had abandoned the purpose of the traffic stop and unlawfully 
extended this stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court in this case 
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correctly held that reasonable suspicion on the part of the officer did not exist prior to 
the officer returning to question Mr. Smith a second time on matters unrelated to his 
speeding violation, at which point the officer observed that Mr. Smith's eyes appeared 
glassy.2 In finding that the actions of the officer prior to this period unlawfully extended 
the traffic stop, the court also limited its analysis to the objective facts shown by the 
evidence: both what the officer did during the course of the traffic stop, and - as 
important- what the officer failed to do. 
The district court engaged in a fairly detailed examination of Officer Scheierman's 
actions with regard to the traffic stop. It noted that the officer's initial approach and 
interrogation of Mr. Smith took between five and seven minutes. (R., pp.157-158.) 
Especially telling in the view of the court was that the officer, to no discernible purpose 
relating the Mr. Smith's offense of speeding, called for the assistance of another officer. 
(R., pp.157-159.) The court also noted that the officer performed two separate checks 
for warrants on Mr. Smith. (R., p.157.) Given the court's detailed examination of the 
objective actions of Officer Scheierman, which are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence, this Court should uphold the trial court's express and implicit 
findings of fact that Mr. Smith's detention was unlawfully extended and that the officer 
did not employ the least intrusive means in investigating Mr. Smith's speeding offense. 
See Frank, 133 Idaho at 367. 
Although the district court disagreed with Officer Scheierman's belief that he had 
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity following the officer's observations 
2 Mr. Smith does not concede in this appeal that the mere fact that the officer believed 
Mr. Smith's eyes to have been glassy, coupled with a two-second conversational pause, 
a messy car, and an absence of luggage, constitutes reasonable suspicion that a crime 
has been committed. 
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upon his initial contact with Mr. Smith, the court's discussion of the issue of reasonable, 
articulable suspicion was limited to whether the circumstances known to Officer 
Scheierman justified the intrusiveness and the extension of Mr. Smith's detention. (R., 
pp.158-159.) 
But more central to the court's conclusion was the absence of any evidence that 
Officer Scheierman was actually pursuing the supposed purpose of Mr. Smith's 
detention throughout the traffic stop. The district court noted that, in the normal course 
of a traffic stop, "the officer is likely writing the ticket while he/she awaits the results of 
the nationwide search." (R., p.157 n.13.) The court took note of this in conjunction with 
the court's finding that Officer Scheierman never wrote nor issued any ticket for the 
offense that purportedly formed the basis of the traffic stop in this case. (R., p.157.) 
The absence of any evidence that the officer was engaged in issuing a traffic citation at 
any point, despite the fact that Mr. Smith's detention was supposedly based upon his 
speeding offense, was at the heart of the district court's decision on Mr. Smith's motion 
to suppress the State's evidence. (R., pp.157-162.) And this, too, was a determination 
made by the trial court based upon the objective evidence, not on any particular belief 
or state of mind on the part of Officer Scheierman. 
As was noted by the district court, Officer Scheierman's actions in this case are 
analogous to those found to have unlawfully extended the traffic stop in Aguirre. See 
Aguirre, 141 Idaho at 562-564. In Aguirre, officers were suspicious of the defendant's 
driving pattern during a traffic stop of another motorist and were familiar with his past 
criminal history. Aguirre, 141 Idaho at 561. When the defendant failed to come to a 
complete stop before entering the roadway from a parking lot, the officers decided to 
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follow Mr. Aguirre and eventually pull him over for his traffic infraction. Id. However, 
almost immediately after pulling the defendant over, the officers in Aguirre abandoned 
any efforts at enforcing the traffic violation, and instead sought permission to search the 
defendant's vehicle and conducted a "drug dog sniff" of the car. Id. at 561-563. 
The Aguirre court noted that the officer's actions operated to extend the duration 
of the traffic stop without legal justification - and that the actions that extended the stop 
bore no relation to the traffic offense that justified the initial detention. Id. at 563-564. 
Even where the extension of the stop is less than two minutes in total, this may 
constitute "an unwarranted intrusion upon the vehicle occupant's privacy and liberty." 
Id. at 563. Central to the Aguirre court's holding was the finding that the officers had 
abandoned the purpose that justified the stop - the issuance of a citation for the traffic 
offense. Id. at 564. 
The same is true of this case, and the district court rightly noted as much. (R., 
pp.157 -162.) In fact, Officer Scheierman admitted that Mr. Smith never even received a 
citation for his traffic offense at any point during his lengthy detention. (Tr., p.26, L.23-
p.27, L.12.) There is no objective evidence that the officer made any effort to pursue 
the purpose that justified Mr. Smith's initial stop - his traffic infraction for speeding -
other than the officer's statement of his personal intention to do so. (Tr., p.26, L.23 -
p.27, L.12.) To the contrary, all of the officer's actions demonstrate that he was focused 
on investigating whether there was any unrelated criminal activity afoot, as is evinced by 
the fact that Officer Scheierman apparently never even began to write any citation for 
the traffic offense. 
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Accordingly, the district court correctly ruled that Officer Scheierman abandoned 
the purposes of the traffic stop and unlawfully extended the duration of this stop prior to 
the time the officer observed Mr. Smith to have "glassy" or "glazed over" eyes. The 
court's order was well-reasoned and was rooted in an examination of the totality of the 
circumstances - including Officer Scheierman's actions as they related to a 
determination of the objective purpose in extending the traffic stop as well as the 
officer's inaction with regard to pursuing the traffic stop following his initial contact with 
Mr. Smith. This is precisely the examination that is required under the Fourth 
Amendment. See State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426,430 (Ct. App. 1996). 
While Mr. Smith does agree with the district court's ultimate holding that the 
traffic stop of Mr. Smith was unlawfully extended and the purpose of the traffic stop 
abandoned, he asserts that the district court did err in its determination that the stop 
was not also unlawfully extended by the protracted questioning by Officer Scheierman 
on matters entirely unrelated to the speeding violation, by the officer running a second 
search on Mr. Smith's license and registration once Officer Scheierman was informed 
that Mr. Smith had a valid Colorado license with no outstanding warrants, and by the 
officer's subsequent pat-down search of Mr. Smith when he was ordered out of the car. 
(R., p.159.) In addition, Mr. Smith further asserts that the means used by the officer in 
these actions were unnecessarily intrusive, and therefore the district court correctly 
determined that suppression of the State's evidence was the appropriate remedy. 
As was noted, this Court reviews de novo constitutional principles as they relate 
to the facts found by the district court. Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 485-486; State v. 
Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 360 (Ct. App. 2000) (addressing for the first time on appeal 
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the issue of whether the officer's questioning and the use of a drug detection dog 
caused the detention to be unnecessarily intrusive because the reasonableness of the 
detention was "a question of law requiring our independent review."). In addition, where 
the district court's order is correct, but on an alternate legal theory, this Court will affirm 
on the correct grounds. State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704 (1996). Because the 
officer's two periods of questioning of Mr. Smith, the pat-down search of him for 
weapons, the multiple series of questions unrelated to the traffic offense, and the 
duplicative nationwide search for other licenses clearly extended the duration of the 
traffic stop in this case, and because the officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion 
for this extension, Mr. Smith submits that this Court should likewise affirm the district 
court on these grounds as well. 
Turning first to the officer's prolonged questioning of Mr. Smith on matters 
unrelated to his offense of speeding, Mr. Smith asserts that this unlawfully prolonged his 
detention and was more intrusive than necessary to effectuate his detention for 
speeding. With regard to the questioning of the defendant on matters unrelated to the 
basis of a traffic stop, "[i]n each case, a court must analyze whether the police conduct 
was more intrusive or of longer duration than reasonably necessary to effectuate the 
investigative detention otherwise authorized by Terry." Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 362. 
Questioning about matters unrelated to the traffic stop is constitutionally permissible, but 
only so far as the questioning does not meaningfully extend the duration of the stop. Id. 
at 361-363. But the questioning in this case, both prior to and following the officer's 
initial check of Mr. Smith's license and registration, did significantly extend the duration 
of the stop, and therefore was not permissible. 
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In Parkinson, the questioning of the defendant about matters unrelated to the 
traffic offense was permissible because it was occurring concurrently with the officer 
running a check on the defendant's license and registration. Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 
361-363. In this case, when Officer Scheierman first began questioning Mr. Smith 
about matters unrelated to his speeding offense, he was not concurrently taking action 
in furtherance of issuing a citation. (R., pp.53, 71-72.) Additionally, Mr. Smith 
acknowledged his violation from the beginning of his encounter with the officer, so there 
was no need for any further investigation into the traffic offense at all. (R., pp.53, 76.) 
In Officer Scheierman's estimation, this initial questioning extended the traffic stop by 
five to seven minutes. (R., pp.80-81.) 
Other cases have also sanctioned brief questioning on matters unrelated to the 
traffic stop where the questioning was supported by the officer's specific, personalized 
knowledge of the defendant or of circumstances amounting to reasonable suspicion. 
See state v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 984-985 (Ct. App. 2003) (identifying ten separate 
factors within the officer's knowledge that provided reasonable, articulable suspicion of 
criminal activity). Here, however, the officer possessed no such information. Such 
questioning is also permissible when it lasts only a matter of seconds, as this is not 
deemed to meaningfully extend the duration of the stop. See, e.g., State v. Ramirez, 
145 Idaho 886, 889-890 (Ct. App. 2008). But in this case, the questioning appears to 
have been prolonged. Mr. Smith immediately acknowledged the speeding violation and 
provided his license and registration. (R., pp.53, 76.) However, the officer estimated 
that his initial contact with, and questioning of, Mr. Smith lasted for between five to 
seven minutes. (R., pp.80-81.) During this period of time, Officer Scheierman was also 
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using his questioning of Mr. Smith as an opportunity to look through his car during the 
interrogation. (R., p.152.) 
In addition, the officer received no new information between his initial questioning 
of Mr. Smith and his second set of questions that would provide reasonable, articulable 
suspicion for his continued questioning on matters unrelated to the traffic offense. In 
fact, the information that the officer did receive in the interim actually dispelled, rather 
than provided, any suspicion of criminal activity. A check of Mr. Smith's license and 
registration in Colorado came back to the officer as revealing that he had a valid license 
and no outstanding warrants. (R., pp.53, 82.) Accordingly, both sets of questioning of 
Mr. Smith regarding matters unrelated to his traffic offense both unlawfully extended the 
duration of his detention and were unnecessarily intrusive. 
Second, there was likewise no objectively reasonable basis for Officer 
Scheierman to have run a second, nationwide search for additional licenses or arrest 
warrants once the officer had received information that Mr. Smith had a valid driver's 
license with no arrest warrants from Colorado. Officer Scheierman, at the time of 
prolonging Mr. Smith's detention to run an additional search for all 50 states, had no 
reason to believe that Mr. Smith had committed any criminal offense, had any criminal 
history, or had a license anywhere other than Colorado. In fact, he had been informed 
that Mr. Smith had a valid license in Colorado and no outstanding warrants. (R., pp.53, 
82.) While the state-specific search took only one minute to complete, the additional 
check added approximately five minutes to the length of the detention to complete. (Tr., 
p.14, L.13 - p.15, L.24.) The State presented no evidence as to why Officer 
Scheierman would need to search for warrants in every state in the country in order to 
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complete a traffic stop for speeding, particularly when he had been informed that 
Mr. Smith had a valid driver's license and no warrants in his home state of Colorado. 3 
Finally, because the officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to have 
conducted a pat-down search of Mr. Smith, Officer Scheierman's actions of doing so 
likewise unlawfully extended the duration of the traffic stop. The case of State v. 
Henage is instructive on this point, as that case sets forth the standards for when a pat-
down search of an individual stopped for a traffic offense is permissible. In Henage, the 
defendant was stopped for having a broken taillight. State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 
658 (Ct. App. 2007). Upon exiting the vehicle, the defendant in Henage was asked 
whether he had any contraband on his person, to which the defendant replied that he 
had a knife. Id Based upon this response, the officer conducted a pat-down search of 
Mr. Henage which ultimately resulted in the discovery of drug paraphernalia and 
methamphetamine. Id 
The Court in Henage determined that there has no lawful basis for the pat-down 
search of the defendant. Henage, 143 Idaho at 661-662. While the officer in Henage 
testified that the defendant appeared nervous and admitted to having a knife, the 
Henage Court held that this was not sufficient to demonstrate the specific, personalized 
and articulable facts that would support such a search. Id The Court therefore held 
that, "[w]eapons searches are not justified by an officer's subjective feeling, especially 
3 The fact that the officer may engage in similarly intrusive searches with other motorists 
during routine traffic stops is not relevant to this analysis, as the pertinent issue is 
whether the actions of the officer were the least intrusive means of investigating the 
basis of the detention without unnecessarily extending the stop, and because this Court 
applies an objective standard to this determination. That the officer may also violate 
other individual's constitutional rights in equal measure as part of the officer's "routine" 
does not sanction the particular constitutional violation that occurred in this case. 
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when that feeling is not particularized to a particular individual in a particular fact 
situation." Id. at 662. 
In this case, there was even less of a basis for Officer Scheierman to claim any 
justification for the pat-down search of Mr. Smith. The sole basis proffered by the officer 
was, "I first - I first ya know [sic] officer safety patted Mr. Smith down for weapons, he 
was smoking a cigarette - had him extinguish that, just for safety purposes as welL" 
(R., p.84.) There was never any evidence in the record of any particularized basis for 
the officer to conclude that Mr. Smith was presently armed and posed a threat. While 
the record does not reflect the duration of this search of Mr. Smith's person while 
outside his car, it is clear that this would have extended the duration of the stop 
because such searches inherently take time to perform. (R., p.84.) Moreover, this was 
not a consensual exchange - the officer's actions of physically patting Mr. Smith down 
for weapons carried with them an "accusatory tenor" that is not indicative of voluntary 
interactions with police. See State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 651 (Ct. App. 2002). 
Because this search was not supported by any reasonable suspicion that Mr. Smith was 
armed and presently dangerous, and because this further extended the duration of his 
traffic stop without legal sanction, Mr. Smith asserts that this extension further supports 
the district court's legal conclusion that the stop was unlawfully extended. 
In addition, these methods were not the least intrusive methods that could have 
been used by the officer in conducting the detention that was supposedly for the 
purpose of issuing a traffic citation for speeding. The investigative methods deployed 
for brief investigative detentions "should be the least intrusive means reasonably 
available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicions in a short period of time." Royer, 460 
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U.S. at 500; see also Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 305-306. The detention at issue was for 
speeding, and yet virtually none of Officer Scheierman's actions appear to have been 
directed at this purpose. Rather than issue a citation upon being informed that 
Mr. Smith had a valid license and no arrest warrants from Colorado, the officer engaged 
in an exploratory search of every other state to look for any indication of unrelated 
criminal activity or warrants. During this duplicative search, which turned up no 
evidence of any other licenses or arrest warrants, the officer removed Mr. Smith from 
his car to perform a pat-down search his person. The only invocation of the basis for 
doing so was Officer Scheierman's fleeting reference to officer safety. Finally, the 
officer - instead of writing out a citation for speeding - returned to question Mr. Smith 
further about matters unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop. Taken together, 
Mr. Smith submits that the actions of the officer during his detention were far more 
intrusive than was necessary to pursue the detention for his traffic offense. Accordingly, 
he submits that this Court should affirm the district court's order on this basis as well. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that, "an investigative detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." 
Royer, 460 U.S. at 500. In this case, the actions of Officer Scheierman, from the time of 
his initial contact with Mr. Smith, objectively evince that the officer extended the stop 
well beyond the time necessary to effectuate the purpose of the traffic stop for 
speeding. Because of this, the district court did not err in granting Mr. Smith's motion to 
dismiss on the basis that his detention was unlawfully extended in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Smith respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
granting his motion to suppress the State's evidence. 
DATED this 30th day of July, 2012. 
SARAH E. TOMP~S 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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